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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
The present dissertation constitutes an analysis of the intermediated securities systems 
and their vulnerabilities. Also, it indicates how these vulnerabilities and the inherent 
characteristics of intermediated holding systems contribute to the creation of fertile 
ground for the perpetrators of financial crime. The writer refers to the main criminal 
activities and other undesirable behavior and highlights the threat these illegal activities 
pose to the integrity, stability and soundness of the financial system. This paper also 
comments on the recent regulatory developments on a European and international level 
regarding preventive measures and compliance techniques which set out increased 
transparency requirements in order to detect and combat financial crime. Finally, it 
underlines the fine line between the necessity for increased transparency and data 
protection implications and concludes by proposing the broader adoption of more 
transparent holding systems. 
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Introduction 
The practice of money laundering (long-term money laundering) is long-lasting and 
international. Channels for money laundering are typically used by credit institutions, 
insurance companies, capital markets, the real estate market, businesses and casinos. In 
addition, an important issue is that of the financing of terrorism, which takes place (often but 
not necessarily linked to money laundering) through similar channels. Today, money 
laundering is a barrier to unimpeded economic stability and prosperity. This is because there 
are not few cases where global financial stability has been disturbed by the action of groups 
or individuals involved in terrorist attacks financed by money from illegal economic activities. 
Flows of illicit money can damage the integrity and stability of the international financial 
sector and also threaten the internal market of the European Union. 
Recent attacks in and outside the European Union have highlighted the need for the EU to 
work in all policies to prevent and combat terrorism. Terrorist organizations and individual 
terrorists need funding - to maintain their networks, recruit and supply, and also to commit 
their terrorist acts. Exclusion from sources of funding, limiting the possibilities of avoiding 
detection of these funds and using all the information resulting from the funding process in 
the best possible way can all contribute significantly to the fight against terrorism. 
The challenge of financing terrorism is not new. Its key features, such as close links to 
organized crime networks, have been known for many years and EU criminal law, police 
cooperation, as well as legislation to prevent and combat money laundering, already 
contribute significantly. However, new trends have emerged, particularly in criminal 
organizations such as Daesh, as well as the role of retaliated foreign terrorist fighters. 
Therefore certain coordinating measures have been taken at Union and international level. 
An intermediary holding system contributes to an efficient and cost-effective movement of 
huge amounts of capital between governments and investors and also to the financing of 
corporate and financial entities. But, as it is evident, in many cases it is difficult to trace the 
transfer and the identity of securities and their holders. The information about the beneficial 
owner of the securities in a system of intermediated securities may not be disclosed and 
therefore traced, which creates lack of transparency in those transactions. This lack of 
transparency enables criminals in the context of money laundering to acquire securities with 
‘dirty money’ held in one or more accounts and then use the proceeds from this transaction 
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as legitimate money. Therefore, the financial system becomes vulnerable, as the origin of a 
huge funds flow is extremely uncertain when it comes to intermediated securities where 
beneficial owners of the traded financial assets are difficult to be traced. 
The ability to prevent and detect money laundering is a very effective means of identifying 
criminals and terrorists and the underlying activity from which the money originates. The 
application of technical information and investigations can be a way of detecting and 
interrupting the activities of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Because they are dealing 
with other people's money, financial institutions rely on the integrity of their reputation. A 
financial institution that has proven to have helped to launder money will be excluded from 
legitimate businesses. An international financial center used for money laundering can 
become an ideal financial shelter. Developing countries that attract “dirty money” as a short-
term driving force for development can find it difficult to attract the kind of stable long-term 
foreign direct investment based on stable conditions and good governance, and this can help 
them to maintain growth and promote long-term growth.
  -3- 
Chapter 1: Transparent and non-transparent securities systems and their 
vulnerabilities 
This first chapter will be about demonstrating the vulnerabilities of intermediated 
securities systems. It starts with a brief securities evolution and continues with a 
comparison between direct holding systems and the intermediated holding system. A 
classification of transparent and non-transparent models follows, in order to explain the 
importance of the element of transparency in the intermediated holding systems. 
Subsequently, the vulnerabilities of the intermediated holding systems will be 
demonstrated. The inherent characteristics of these holding systems do not facilitate 
the revelation of the investor’s identity and thus may possibly provide with an advantage 
the perpetrators of financial crime. Next, an analysis of money laundering, terrorist 
financing and financing of proliferation, insider trading and other illegal activities 
follows. In addition, the interaction of these illegal activities with the intermediated 
securities system will be demonstrated, highlighting the threat they pose to the 
soundness, integrity and stability of financial system. 
1.1 Intermediated securities system: a comparison to other holding systems and its 
variations 
1.1.1 Securities evolution: immobilisation and dematerialisation 
 
The importance of securities can scarcely be exaggerated. Securities, such as bonds and 
shares, are a key instrument for both governments and businesses all over the world to 
collect funds. Tremendous amount of securities is also traded in the wholesale financial 
markets.1 Securities markets offer space for businesses to raise money by issuing shares 
and bonds for attracted parties to invest. Last decades securities markets have altered 
into electronic impersonal spaces that are more reachable by the public largely.2 
In the distant past, ownership of securities was a quite plain deal, as they were separated 
into two kinds: bearer securities and registered securities. Widely generalising, debt 
                                                 
1 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law – Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2015) p. 425 
2 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account Holders 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 21 
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securities were bearer securities and shares were registered securities. Bearer securities 
were incorporated in a piece of paper, the person who held that paper was the owner 
of securities and transfer was conducted by delivery. Registered securities were also 
represented by a piece of paper, but legal title resulted from the entry on the entity’s 
record and paper was just proof of this.  The movement of pieces of paper were 
necessary condition for both systems, and as the amount of securities and transactions 
increased, this became complicated and costly in money and time. Moreover, the 
necessity to register transfers of registered securities in the register kept by the 
corporation also decelerated trading. Thus, the use of electronic means of settlement 
contributed to the development of new methods of settlement which help to avoid the 
credit risk of a time gap between delivery and payment, which could not function if 
securities were still in paper form.3 In the last decades, the tremendous progress of 
technology has contributed to the appearance and extraordinary augmentation of 
intermediated securities markets. Technology assisted to the transmutation from a 
system where the physical transfer of paper securities or the registration of a transfer 
directly in the issuer’s register was the rule, to one where transferences of securities are 
listed as electronic book entries on accounts held by financial intermediaries, such as 
banks or other financial institutions.4 Over the last half century the method of holding 
and disposing of investment securities has mutated significantly. Diverging from the 
conventional model of custody or deposit of physical certificates, a holding system 
through intermediaries has been emerged on grounds of effectiveness, operational 
certitude, velocity and security. In this system, the largest portion of securities is 
immobilised with a Central Securities Depository (‘CSD’) and is often dematerialised, 
which in many legal regimes has become mandatory. The investor holds securities 
through a chain of intermediaries that are ultimately connected to the CSD. In practice, 
the transfer of securities and the formation of security and other limited interests 
thereto, are usually performed by book entries to the securities accounts concerned. 
                                                 
3 Louise Gullifer ‘Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 
p. 1-2 
4 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Transnational Commercial Law – Texts, Cases 
and Materials (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2015) p. 425 
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The securities themselves are not physically shifted.5 Intermediated holding chains 
compose a keystone of the universal financial system. In the modern system of indirect 
possession of securities, the role of custodians is fundamental. The primary service of 
custodians is to keep the securities deposited with them (usually by the issuer) either 
personalized in hard copy or in the form of a single security or accounting. In addition to 
this basic service, custodians may also , to provide capital management services, 
securities lending, dividend collection and distribution, corporate / shareholder 
communications, mediation of corporate actions (such as the exercise of voting rights), 
etc., and to provide securities settlement and clearing services are in place to complete 
the transfer of rights. Depositary services are provided by central securities depositors 
(CSDs) and international securities depositories (ICSDs), but also by other institutions 
such as banks, credit institutions etc. The presence of custodians in cross-border 
transactions and, more generally, in the international, but also in the internal, financial 
system contributes to the increased effectiveness of the capital markets and the 
reduction of the risk theft or destruction. 
Although national and international custodians basically offer the same services, so the 
repository and depository concepts are used interchangeably, there are, or at least, 
some differences between them at the birth of the institutions. Local Securities 
Depositories (CSDs) historically play the central role of the operator of local securities 
settlement systems. Under this function they keep accounting balance sheets for the 
issues of securities deposited with them and ensure the irrevocability of entries in the 
country's accounting records. Traditionally they act as a central point of deposit of 
securities (either tangible or intangible in the form of mere electronic registrations), 
carry out basic securities transactions, cash displacements and custody services. In 
addition, they benefit from close links with central counterparties and regulated 
markets in order to ensure a smooth and effective trade promotion. However, due to 
                                                 
5 Hideki Kanda, Charles Mooney, Luc Thevenoz, Stephane Beraud assisted by Thomas Keijser, Official 
Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (Oxford 
University Press 2012) p.1 
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the essential services they provide, they are prone to systemic risk. Their clients are 
primarily financial institutions and not private investors.6 
The transition from physical delivery of securities to electronic means of transfer was 
achieved thanks to the use of two aforementioned techniques that were developed in 
order to handle the problem of too much paper, namely immobilisation and 
dematerialisation.  Immobilising securities, either bearer or registered, was the first 
technique. Thus, securities are held by a central depository which is connected with one 
or more intermediaries, who in turn hold either for investors or for other intermediaries. 
In this scheme, transactions and settlement can take place rapidly and simply between 
intermediaries, who participate in the relevant exchange, as the intermediaries’ records 
are electronic.7 In contemporary markets, most securities are immobilised with 
depositories, instead of moving around as certificates. After securities have been 
deposited, posterior transfers can be conducted by book entries to the accounts held by 
the intermediary. Securities may be, and typically are, immobilised at a specially 
designated institution, known as the Central Securities Depository (CSD), or at a financial 
institution that offers custodial services to its clients. Securities are immobilised at CSD 
by depositing the physical certificate or by registering the CSD as the holder of securities 
on the issuer’s records in a dematerialised form. Although, the second has become the 
more preponderant mode of immobilisation, yet, companies and other financial entities 
still issue securities in the form of a single certificate, embodying the entire issue, which 
is delivered as such to a CSD.8  
The second technique was dematerialising the securities, so that the source of title is 
neither a piece of paper nor the entity’s register, but an electronic entry on the books 
of a central depository. Dematerialisation permits rapid electronic settlement to occur, 
which is true for immobilisation as well, and thus eliminates many weak points of the 
paper-based system. However, it requires relevant legislation to be established. It is 
                                                 
6 Luc Thevenoz, ‘The Geneva Securities Convention: objectives, history, and guiding principles’ in Pierre – 
Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thevenoz (eds), Intermediated Securities: The Impact of the Geneva 
Securities Convention and the Future European Legislation (Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 3-9 
7 Louise Gullifer ‘Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 
p. 2 
8 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account 
Holders (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 36 
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possible for dematerialised securities to be held through intermediaries, either 
obligatorily, as mentioned above, or optionally, as in UK’s example, where investors can 
either be direct members of CREST (i.e. a UK-based Central Securities Depository) or can 
hold through an intermediary which is a member of CREST.9 In other words, 
dematerialisation is the procedure where paper certificates are transformed into 
electronic entries, understood not only as a technological transformation, but also as a 
legal concept and in order to achieve that renovation, the law must acknowledge this 
new kind of electronic securities and sufficiently guard the investors’ rights. Thus, a new 
type of uncertificated security appears and this security is now composed and 
demonstrated by book entries.10 
1.1.2 The intermediated holding chain 
Figure 1 that follows illustrates the intermediated holding chain. It constitutes a 
generally plain scheme representing the intermediated holding system. Primary actors 
who take part in this system are the issuer, the central securities depository (CSD), 
intermediaries and account holders or investors. Typical issuers of securities are 
governments, in the case of bonds, and private entities, in the case of shares. Between 
the issuer of the title and the final investor there may be a small or a large number of 
intermediaries, leading to a multilevel or multidimensional scheme that reflects the 
relationships that are created during the release of titles in the system in question. The 
existence of intermediaries generally abolishes the direct relationship between the 
investor and the issuer. Indeed, there is no direct relationship either between the 
investor and the central body in which the securities are deposited or registered at the 
time of issue, as the investor's right is not recorded in the original depositary's file. The 
final investor, therefore, knows only the intermediary person with whom he / she 
immediately comes into contact and contracted. 
The existence of intermediaries is associated with specific advantages for the investor. 
Firstly, it reduces the risk of a transaction error, as these are specialized persons with 
the technological infrastructure and financial training to provide this service. In addition, 
                                                 
9 Louise Gullifer ‘Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 
p. 2 
10 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account Holders 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 34 
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intermediates provide other services to their clients, such as managing their portfolio 
and providing investment advice. Portfolio management and management are 
particularly important when it comes to a portfolio of domestic and foreign securities.11 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The intermediated holding chain12 
 
As it has been demonstrated by the above figure, in contemporary financial markets, 
securities such as shares or bonds are generally held through intermediaries and traded 
by electronic book - entries on securities accounts. In its most plain scheme, an 
intermediated holding system may be perceived as a three – tier pyramid: the investors, 
who are usually the ultimate account holders, are at the bottom, and their securities are 
credited to securities accounts held by their intermediaries. The intermediaries, in turn, 
hold their securities on a book-entry basis with the top-tier intermediary, typically a 
Central Securities Depository (CSD). Particularly in cross-border transactions, this multi-
tiered structure can have more levels. Nevertheless, irrespectively of the number of 
levels, all intermediated holding systems have in common that no certificates move 
around, and that the securities are shifted by debiting and crediting to securities 
                                                 
11 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Transnational Commercial Law - Text, Cases 
and Materials (Second edition, Oxford University Press 2015), p.427 
12 Ibid. 
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accounts. Gradually, certificated securities are being substituted by fully dematerialised 
securities.13 
 
1.1.3 Direct and intermediated holding systems: their variations 
The consequence of the securities’ immobilisation is the gradual erosion of the direct 
connection among the issuer and the securities’ holders. Expediting the enforcement of 
the rights enclosed in immobilised securities is now duty of intermediaries and the 
nature of holding systems has converted from direct to the so-called intermediated. On 
the contrary, in a direct holding system the investor, who holds a security certificate and 
is listed on the issuer’s books, can enforce his rights directly against the issuer. As the 
investor is not requesting through an intermediary, the issuer’s obligations link to the 
rights of different investors. Securities holders and issuers are in contact. Transactions 
of securities in a direct holding system are conducted by delivery of the corresponding 
certificates or registration on the issuer’s books which is not the case in an 
intermediated holding system. In the latter, the investor has not a direct relationship 
with the issuer, but instead a securities account is kept with an intermediary in his name 
(investor’s), which could also be the CSD. Its rights to the security may be enforced 
through the intermediary. In such situation, the security holder is not in relation with 
the issuer, but with its intermediary. As it is mentioned before, in an intermediated 
holding system, transfers of securities are conducted by book entries to the account 
holders’ securities accounts held by intermediaries.14 
Regarding direct and intermediated holding systems, the one does not preclude the 
existence of the other. Nowadays, a small minority of securities is held directly and the 
majority is held through intermediaries. The legislation concerning securities’ holding 
also mirrors the coexistence of these two holding systems. Even the “Unidroit 
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities” known as the “Geneva 
Securities Convention” in its article 29 (1) acknowledges that multiple systems could 
operate in alongside and does not demand for the contracting states to wholly 
                                                 
13 Pierre – Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thevenoz, Intermediated Securities The Impact of the Geneva 
Securities Convention and the Future European Legislation (Cambridge University Press 2013) p.xxi 
14 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account Holders 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 39 
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substitute their existing systems with an intermediated holding system. The direct 
holder may endorse the security’s certificate, deposit it with an intermediary and accept 
a credit to his securities account. In reverse, in an indirect system, a securities account 
holder may claim from its intermediary that his account be debited and a security 
certificate be delivered to him, unless the implementation of such request is forbidden 
by the terms of the issuance.15  
Intermediation is at the core of accounts holding systems’ legislation.16 Even in regimes 
where it is offered to the investor the opportunity to choose between a direct or through 
an intermediary holding system, the last has many advantages. The most important, 
among others, is the facilitating of transactions and settlement.17 Secondly, 
intermediaries execute numerous critical functions such as founding and holding 
accounts for their clients, carrying out customers’ instructions to transfer assets and 
funds in and out of those accounts, clearing clients’ specific transactions, providing 
credit to them, offering advice-giving services and cutting down monitoring costs.18 
Nevertheless, one should consider also the several complications and issues generated 
by intermediated holding of securities and the numerous efforts to deal with these at a 
national and international level. The fundamental question which rises about the 
intermediated holding of securities is whether this system of holding enhances the risk 
for the investor. The business of securities’ holding, even directly, inherently contains 
some level of risk, as the price of shares may go down as well as up depending on issuer’s 
luck, while the price of securities’ liability is directly influenced by the issuer’s ability to 
recompense. These jeopardies known as ‘issuer risk’ are well recognized and are 
independent of the type of system (intermediated or not) chosen. In case of 
intermediation, the investor additionally bears ‘intermediary risk’ which contains the 
risk of intermediary’s economic insolvency and the danger that the intermediary will 
‘lose’ the securities. Additionally, there is a hazard for the holder of losing the privileges 
that it had as a direct holder, such as voting rights, if the securities are shares, or the 
                                                 
15 Ibid at p. 40 
16 Ibid at p. 10 
17 Louise Gullifer ‘Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 
p. 3 
18 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account Holders 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 10 
  -11- 
right to direct a bond trustee in relation to the enforcement of the bond, in case of debt 
securities. One method of evaluating the system is to examine how it differentiates the 
position of an investor who holds intermediated securities from that of a direct holder. 
However, the evaluation is a process that every investor should do, finding the 
advantages and disadvantages of intermediation so that the appropriate choice can be 
made. 19 
 
Progressively, the attention has transferred to classifying the different types of 
intermediated holding systems and identifying their complex characteristics. The project 
that led to the adoption of the Geneva Securities Convention gave momentum to this 
shift towards identification and classification. Architecturally, all intermediated holding 
systems resemble. The securities holding pyramid is constituted by the CSD at the top, 
intermediaries in the middle and account holders at the lower level. Though, the nature 
of rights and the distinct elements of accounts relationships vary essentially. Initially, as 
a wide classification, two fundamental types of intermediated holding systems were 
established: ‘indirect’ and ‘transparent’. While indirect holding systems are considered 
to have uniform characteristics and structures, the transparent holding systems did not. 
A typical characteristic of an indirect holding system, in contrast to the transparent 
holding system, is that the CSD remains unaware of the identity of particular account 
holders other than its participating intermediaries. In indirect holding systems, the 
relationships between the intermediaries and account holders are irrespective one from 
another. In transparent systems mid-level entities hold accounts for investors but the 
aim of such holding is simply administrative. Only transfers recorded at the CSD level 
have constitutive effects. 20 
When the laws and rules in one country conflict with those in other countries there 
might be a situation where one state’s legislation influences the legal status of the same 
primary securities. Each jurisdiction has a detailed legal framework leading this holding 
chain condition. This domestic legal framework dictate the legal position, the rights and 
                                                 
19 Louise Gullifer ‘Ownership of Securities: the Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 
p. 4 
20 Marek Dubovec, The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts – The Rights of Account Holders 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) p. 41-42 
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responsibilities of every partaker in the holding chain, covering the position of the 
investor, the intermediary or intermediaries, and the CSD. It is significant to highlight 
that domestic law only rules the whole holding chain between investor and issuer as 
long as the holding chain is clearly domestic. As soon as foreign intermediaries are 
involved, it is extremely possible that foreign law applies to certain parts of it.  
There are five fundamental holding models for securities, which will subsequently be 
examined, because it important for the reader to understand the differences between 
transparent and non-transparent systems in order to evaluate the element of 
transparency in the intermediated holding chain. These models are the trust model, the 
entitlement model, the unshared property model, the pooled property model and the 
transparent model.21 
 
The trust model 
The trust model is defined as the legal relationship between a trustee (or more) and one 
(or more) beneficiary, according to which the trustee is required to manage property, 
the ownership of which (or other right in rem, ) is transferred to him for the benefit of 
the beneficiary. The property transferred to his trustee belongs formally (technically), 
that is, according to the term used, the legal title or legal ownership. As to third parties, 
he appears as the legal owner of the property. The beneficiary, on the other hand, has 
a beneficial ownership or equitable interest, that is, a right to the income derived from 
the asset the trustee has the legal ownership of. This right also extends in return for the 
sale of the assets. 
The beneficiary's right, however, is not only liable to the trustee for fulfilling his 
obligations. He has a right in rem in the estate of the trust, which allows him to claim 
the property both by the trustee and by the persons to whom it comes (even in the case 
of bankruptcy or death of the trustee), without his consent (unless the acquirer is a bona 
fide third party). In other words, this property is an autonomous unity that is separate 
from the trustee's property and, according to the law, cannot fall to its heirs and be 
disposed of to the demands of its personal creditors. 
                                                 
21 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European efforts 
to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 May 2011) p.13- 
14  
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Regarding the conditions for credibility of trust, the following should be observed: While 
there is no problem with the first two conditions in the system of indirect securities, the 
latter condition has been a matter of case law and theory in the countries of Anglo-
Saxon law - the trust model is mainly found in jurisdictions as England and Wales; 
coherent models are also encountered in Ireland, Australia, and other common law 
countries. In this respect, it should first of all be said that the subject of the trust may be 
both movable and immovable, even rights, whether real or involuntary, provided they 
are identifiable. A trust relationship can only be established if its subject is specific. This 
is not a problem when the object is a house, a plot or some tangible mobile thing. 
However, in the case of intangible securities held in collective accounts and fungible 
bulks, where there is no allocation of specific securities to particular investors, it is 
questionable whether the third requirement for credible trust formation is fulfilled.22 
 
The security entitlement model 
The security entitlement model appears similarities to some degree with the trust 
model, but also displays differences. This model is encountered in the USA and Canada. 
The CSD in the USA is named Depository and Trust Company (DTC). A securities contract 
to ensure the fulfillment of obligations under another contract takes up a significant part 
of international transactions. This development is due to the continuous development 
of securities lending and repos, the establishment of central counterparties and the use 
of cash by central banks in the settlement of securities transactions. The provision of 
financial security in international transactions ensures the smooth operation of the 
settlement through the continuous liquidity it ensures, guarantees the fulfillment of the 
obligations undertaken in the course of trade, helps to cover the credit risks to which an 
international depositary is exposed in the exercise of its activities, it facilitates the 
exercise of collateral management and strengthens the financing of s, thus encouraging 
the participation of international investment funds in local markets. However, its main 
importance lies in the fact that the recipient of the security-lender is satisfied first of all 
in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy or other reason for failure to fulfill the obligation. 
                                                 
22 Ibid at p.14-15 
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The provision of security includes the transfer of rights by the debtor to the lender and 
can take place in two ways: (a) by the transfer of the full ownership of the securities 
constituting the security to the lender - securities and repo agreements); and (b) the 
acquisition of a limited interest or security interest in the collateral, while ownership 
remains with the collateral provider. In the former case, the collateral provider transfers 
ownership of the securities to the collateral taker and acquires a contractual right to 
return, in the performance of its obligations, equivalent and equivalent securities to 
those provided as collateral. The collateral taker acquires the full ownership of the 
securities and is entitled to have them as desired. If he fails to redeem the securities, he 
has to pay their market value. If the collateral provider fails to fulfill his obligations under 
the borrowing agreement, the collateral taker may set aside his obligation to repay 
equivalent securities against his claim against the collateral provider, provided this is 
permitted by the law applicable to the collateral arrangement.23 
 
The undivided property model 
In legal jurisdictions where this category of rights is recognized (such as in France, where 
the CDS is called Euroclear), the single collective account maintained on behalf of 
investors is treated as a distinct asset segment in which investors have joint ownership 
rights. The specific features of the rights in this distinct set may differ from fair to legal, 
but generally include co-ownership of a set of securities resulting from the accounting 
records of the intermediary's records with which each investor contributes. The 
advantage of such rights is that the intermediary does not own the securities and its 
personal creditors cannot be satisfied with them. Consequently, in the event of 
bankruptcy, such securities are not part of his bankruptcy estate. 
The right of joint ownership may be either a co-ownership rights traceable to actual 
pools of securities or a co-ownership rights in notional pools of securities. In the first 
case, it is the ownership rights of all the (immobilized) securities deposited with the 
depositary. As in the category of direct ownership rights, the intermediary plays no role, 
since the whole range of intermediaries is penetrated to the original custodian and the 
rights refer to all the titles on it. Rights of this kind are considered functionally identical 
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to traditional rights in liens on individual discrete securities. In the case of the securities 
account, the right of joint ownership does not depend on the actual place where all the 
securities are located. This is a right of joint ownership, which is evidenced only by the 
accounting records of the intermediary's record, regardless of where the individual 
securities or the actual set of securities are. This means, for example, that the pledge is 
not recommended on the underlying securities (found in the original custodian), but on 
the debtor's joint ownership of all the securities.24 
 
The pooled property model 
Germany and Austria, also Japan, apply the pooled property model. The issuer deposits 
its securities with Clearstream Banking in Germany or OeKB (Oesterreichische 
Kontrollbank) in Austria and the investor obtains, under this system, a shared interest in 
a pool of securities which is placed at the level of the CSD. It is a sui generis kind of shared 
property which only exists in this exact framework. The investor's right, registered with 
accounts in the account managed by the intermediary, is treated as a sui generis set of 
rights and interests, which are opposed only to the intermediary with which the investor 
contracted and whose records he has open a relevant securities account. The 
relationship between the client investor and the counterparty intermediary is a central 
axis of this legal construction. 
A feature of this set of rights is that the investor is not allowed to penetrate the entire 
chain of intermediaries by exercising directly a right in rem against the original 
depositary to which the securities are deposited or registered or against the issuer. The 
justification for the arrangement is that each intermediary is only aware of the identity 
and financial standing of his client - who may be the final investor or another 
intermediary who also holds securities accounts for his own clients - while it is not 
possible to know who customers are clients of or their customers in the pyramid of 
operators. It should be noted, however, that although rights are only opposed to the 
investor's direct counterparty, it is more than a common guilty claim. Satisfaction of the 
rights of the account holder takes precedence over the claims of the personal, non-
privileged, creditors of the direct ombudsman to a potential bankruptcy of the latter. In 
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other words, the account holder does not risk the activities of the intermediary with 
which he / she is cooperating.25 
 
The transparent model 
This approach is adopted by Nordic countries, Greece and Poland and also outside 
Europe, China and Brazil have structures which are similar to this approach. In case of 
purely national holdings, there are no intermediaries tangled in a transparent system, 
besides the CSD and each investor holds his account directly with the CSD. According  to  
this  principle,  investors  in  intermediated  securities  do  not under  normal  
circumstances enjoy  direct  rights  of  action  against  the  issuer,  but must  rely  on  the  
Relevant  Intermediary  to  assert,  or  arrange  for  the  assertion  of, the rights associated 
with their holdings on their behalf. The banks carrying out the securities business do not 
hold an account for the investor but only operate the one held by the CSD under a special 
legal and operational background and for this reason they are also called account 
operators. The investor has a direct and unshared property interest in the securities. For 
cross-jurisdictional holdings, the transparent system does not function, because the 
foreign intermediaries that are involved cannot directly operate the accounts in the CSD 
as they are not part of that highly integrated national system. Consequently, the regime 
for cross-jurisdictional holdings in a transparent system is similar to the pooled property 
model.26 
It should be noted, that only transparent holding systems are truly ‘direct’. Therefore, 
in the technical debate, the concepts of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ should be abandoned in 
favor of the models designated before.27 
1.1.4 The existing gap between the issuer and the investor 
One issue arisen and commentated by academics and participants of the financial 
services industry was the extensive number of intermediaries providing their services in 
this field. According to the Lamfalussy report28, “a large number of transaction and 
clearing and settlement systems…fragment liquidity and increase costs, especially for 
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cross-border clearing and settlement”. As it is noticed in the first report of the Giovannini 
Group29 the EU market is ‘highly fragmented’ in clearing and settling transactions. 
Especially in case of cross-border clearing and settlement, it involves ‘very high cost’ as 
the intermediaries should cover the cost of operating facilities and personnel, and 
additionally, the majority of intermediaries should profit enough to recompense the 
investors. Yet, the cost is not the only burden that an investor (in an intermediated 
holding system) suffers, but intermediation rises also the inherent legal risk for the 
investor’s interests which may not be sufficiently protected because of the existence of 
numerous layers of intermediation between the ultimate investor and the issuer, 
forming a significant gap. This gap should be highlighted, as inherent legal risks resulting 
from this gap threaten the protection of the investor’s interests, economic, corporate 
and others. As the number of intermediaries enlarges, the same happens to the risk. 
Domestic laws of each jurisdiction regulate the level of protection of the investors. 
Nevertheless, the inherent legal risk of an intermediated holding chain because of the 
gap still stands, even though the investor may have certain privileges and there is 
integrity and efficiency in the financial markets. 30 
1.2 The element of transparency in holding systems 
As it was mentioned before, in transparent holding systems, the identification of the 
beneficial owner seems to be a quite simple work. The CSD remains aware of the identity 
of all its account holders and retains a relationship with them while all transactions are 
recorded on a central register. Recording the transfers at the CSD level has constitutive 
effects and, except from the presence of a top-level intermediary, there may be further 
banks or further financial institutions sharing functions. On the contrary, in non-
transparent holding systems the CSD cannot detect the identity of their exact account 
holders. The relations between the CSD and the intermediaries are detached from the 
relations between the intermediaries and the account holders.31 All data flows regarding 
the holding and transfer of securities happen only between the transacting partakers. 
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Each partaker is only aware of the partaker immediately lower or upper in chain, i.e. an 
intermediary knows its account holders but if these account holders operate as account 
providers too, has no information about their clients – account holders or any other 
account holders down the chain, and certainly does not know the ultimate investor. 
Because of the aforementioned absence of briefing, the rights of the account holders 
are restricted to the intermediary directly above them, which establishes the “no-look-
through principle” mentioned above.32 
All the aforementioned end up to the conclusion that information on the identity of the 
beneficial owner of securities, whether it is a legal entity or a natural person, its 
professional doings and probably the origins of its assets, all can be found to the data 
noted in the original account contract signed with the bank or the financial institution 
performing as an account provider. These information flows are inconsistent with the 
legal construction of an intermediated holding system, where every intermediary 
connects with the directly down or up in chain participant and also a tension with the 
attractive results of the no-look-through principle is observed. Certainly, the presence 
of that principle has contributed to the reinforcement of the legal certainty within the 
intermediated securities system in the notion that every intermediary and the CSD are 
only responsible for meeting their obligations encompassed in the contracts they signed 
as account holders or account providers and not for actions or omissions of other 
participants down or up in chain. Furthermore, the same principle is related to the 
effectiveness and the scale economies unrolled within that holding chain. Intermediated 
securities are relocated by crediting these securities to that account holder’s securities 
account. In the example of pooled accounts, the transference of securities between two 
clients of the similar intermediary is technically easy and plain and involves no 
retardations, while netting is much more facile, meaning that transfers of securities 
between participants of the holding chain, according to their position within the context 
of the holding chain, may take place quicker and in a cost-effective manner because 
every instruction that ends up to the accounts’ crediting and debiting is not 
implemented distinctly and outwardly but is rather a part of an offsetting procedure 
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between the values of multiple locations and payments due to be exchanged between 
participants and, thus, an ultimate net position is noted on the accounts of the relevant 
intermediaries contributing to the rapidity and comfort of transfer and settlement.33 
Subsequently, someone could claim that the legal construction of the intermediated 
securities holding system built on the no-look through principle is depicted by a 
fundamental feature: the lack of a direct link between the ultimate investor and the 
trading and settlement process of the financial assets that he owns or, elsehow, a type 
of limitation in the investor’s capacity to enforce its rights against the issuer, not only 
because the investor may lose the ability to directly assert  claims against upper-tier 
intermediaries or the issuer, but also due to the fact that the identity of the securities 
and the identity of that investor, are not easy to be traced within the chain of 
intermediaries. Particularly when netting via pooled accounts take place, it almost turns 
out to be tremendously difficult to trace the securities’ transfer from one account to 
another, or for a credit entry to be matched with a particular debit entry. 34 
1.3 Securities market vulnerabilities and financial crime 
The aforementioned inherent characteristics of non-transparent intermediated 
securities systems, compared to other holding systems, provide with a privilege the 
potential perpetrators of financial crimes and they pose a threat to the soundness, 
integrity and stability of the financial system and the financial institutions.  
According to the “EU Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing” combating the 
financing of terrorism is vital for the security of citizens, but taking further steps to 
eliminate the possibilities of terrorist financing can also threaten the lives and economic 
activity of citizens and businesses across the Union. Money laundering can also threaten 
the internal market of the Union as well as international growth.35  
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Money laundering is, though, a fundamentally simple concept. It is the process by which 
proceeds from a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins.36 Money 
laundering is generally defined as consisting of three stages: Placement, layering and 
integration. Nevertheless, not all money laundering transactions contain all three 
separate stages and some could include more. The placement stage encompasses the 
physical movement of money or assets coming from illegal activities to a position or type 
less suspicious to law enforcement authorities. Proceeds are imported into financial 
institutions or into the retail markets. The second stage is defined as layering and 
involves the separation of proceeds from their illegal foundation by using multiple 
compound financial transactions to obscure the audit trail and hide the resources. The 
third stage is the so-called integration, in which, illegal proceeds are transformed into 
apparently legitimate professional incomes through normal financial or commercial 
activities.37 
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which is recognized as the 
international standard setter for anti-money laundering (AML) efforts, defines the term 
“money laundering” briefly as “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their 
illegal origin in order to legitimize the ill-gotten gains of crime”. A money laundering 
predicate offence is the primary criminal activity that produced proceeds, which when 
laundered, ends up to the offence of money laundering. The predicate offences were 
limited originally to drug trafficking offences by the terms of the ‘UN Convention against 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988’, the so-called Vienna 
Convention. Over the years, though, international community has established the 
understanding that predicate offences for money laundering should go far beyond drug 
trafficking. Thus, FATF and other international instruments have extended the Vienna 
Convention’s definition of predicate offences to embrace other serious crimes. 
Nowadays, the FATF Recommendations ‘International Standards on combating money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation’ (updated October 2018) 
integrates the technical and legal definitions of money laundering set out in the Vienna 
                                                 
36 Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 
The World Bank (January 2006), p.I-1 
37 Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against Money laundering 
(November 2004), p. 25 
  -21- 
and Palermo38 Conventions and lists, today, 21 elected categories of offences that are 
considered as predicate offences for money laundering. 39  
The initial FATF Recommendations were drafted in 1990 as an initiative to fight the 
abuse of financial systems by individuals who laundered drug money. In 1996 the 
Recommendations were revised for the first time to keep pace with developing money 
laundering trends and practices, and to widen their scope well beyond drug-money 
laundering. In October 2001 the FATF extended its command to deal with the problem 
of the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations, and went ahead to the 
significant step of forming the Eight (later expanded to Nine) Special Recommendations 
on Terrorist Financing. The FATF Recommendations were revised a second time in 2003, 
and these, along with the Special Recommendations, have been approved by over 180 
countries and they are recognised as the international standard for anti-money 
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).40 The proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction is also a substantial security concern, and in 2008 the 
FATF’s command was extended to contain dealing with the funding of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.41 
Thus, the original legislation has now been extended in the majority of countries to 
include terrorist financing, and more lately, to embody funds generated by any illegal 
act. The financing of terrorism is also a fundamentally simple concept. It is the financial 
sustenance, of any kind, of terrorism or those who embolden, design, or participate in 
terrorism. More difficult project, is, however, to describe terrorism itself, due to the 
substantial political, spiritual and national implications that may be derived by the term 
from country to country.42 
The practices used to launder money are fundamentally similar to those used to cover 
up the origins of, and uses for, terrorist financing. Resources used to fund terrorism 
could also emanate from legitimate sources, as well as criminal activities, or both. 
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However, hiding the fountain of terrorist financing, irrespectively of whether the 
fountain is legitimately or illicitly originated, is crucial. If the fountain can be obscured, 
it remains accessible for future terrorist financing actions. In the same way, it is vital for 
terrorists to cover the use of the funds as well, so that the financing activity goes 
unnoticed.43 
The securities market performs a core role in the international financial sector. This 
market has for a long time been defined by such characteristics, as the velocity in 
executing transactions, the worldwide range, and the ability to adapt, that could make 
itself attractive to those who would misuse it for illegitimate purposes, such as money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Furthermore, the securities market is possibly the 
only one among industries that can be used both to launder illegal proceeds which were 
acquired elsewhere, and to produce illegal proceeds within the industry itself through 
fraudulent activities. Trades and practices related to money laundering and the 
particular predicate securities offences are usually challenging to separate, which is why 
the hazards linked with the several categories of intermediaries, products, payment 
methods and customers involved in the securities industry should be clarified. 
Contrasting to other kind of markets, the dangers appear mostly not in the placement 
stage of money laundering, but rather in the stages of layering and integration. 
Characteristic laundering patterns related to securities frequently include a sequence of 
transactions that do not suit the investor’s profile and do not seem planned to provide 
yield on the investment. Reporting suspicious business deals in the market is still rather 
low and that could be explained by a number of potential reasons, counting the lack of 
information and inadequate securities-specific indicators. The reported cases of money 
laundering in the securities market long exceed those concerning terrorist financing. 
Nevertheless, the securities market is still exposed to both money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 44 
Although money laundering in general includes the import of illegal funds into the 
financial system, securities can also act as a vehicle for producing illegal funds within the 
financial system. The FATF glossary contains among the list of “designated categories of 
offences”, three predicate offences to money laundering which are encountered 
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especially in securities market: insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud, i.e. 
securities-related fraud.45 Recognizing and reporting these three securities-specific 
designated offences, which are encompassed in an important number of jurisdictions, 
could contribute to the prevention of money laundering.46 
While insider trading is illegitimate behavior, it does not imply that business insiders, 
such as officers, directors and employees, can never have dealings with shares of the 
company’s securities. In several regimes, though, these dealings should be reported to 
officials and the public under specific conditions. Nevertheless, insider trading 
implicates situations where the buyer and seller of securities, whether it is a corporate 
insider or not, holds substantial, non-public information regarding the security and 
infringes a fiduciary duty or other affiliation of trust and confidence in that respect. This 
could also involve situations where this person possessing substantial, non-public 
information offers it to someone else for trading and the addressee of that information 
could also infringe insider trading laws. The illegitimate proceeds produced by insider 
trading can be laundered through the securities market itself or other parts of the 
financial system.47 
Market manipulation, in general, relates to a deceitful behavior to the detriment of 
investors by controlling or artificially influencing the market for a security. Specifically, 
the manipulator’s target is to direct the value of a security up or down so that he can 
benefit from value differences. Manipulators use several techniques to accomplish 
these effects and the most erosive market manipulation technique includes the so-
called “pump-and-dump” scheme. This scheme includes pushing a firm’s stock with false 
or misleading statements, often in combination with securities transactions that elevate 
the value of the security or make it look as if the securities trading volume is higher than 
it truly is. Therefore the security value is artificially upraised (“pumped”), the security is 
then sold (“dumped”) for a profit. Usually the original security is low priced, illiquid, and 
trades with little volume.48 
Securities fraud mostly refers to deceptive practices in relation with the offer and sale 
of securities. From this point of view, securities fraud includes insider trading and market 
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manipulation. However, the real venders of these generally of no value shares are 
usually established in a different country from the buyer, making hard the access to 
those who commit the fraud.49 
Furthermore, other criminal activity linked to money laundering in securities markets is 
tax evasion and corruption. Corporate enterprises, in order to avoid or minimize 
taxation outflows, often use schemes with securities that usually involve transactions 
for the purchase or sale of securities in diverse tax periods, exploitation or differing 
taxation rules between different countries.50 
In addition, securities transactions can also be used to make payments in order to 
corrupt officials and politically exposed persons (PEPs). For example, transferring bearer 
securities which either be sold or deposited as collateral for a loan or selling securities 
at off-market prices to PEPs indicates a method of recompensing PEPs for corrupt 
services without leaving a cash-based audit trail.51 
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Chapter 2: International and European Provisions – the increased 
transparency requirements 
This second chapter will focus on the increased transparency requirements, through the 
prism of international and European legislation. It will refer to the recent 5th AML 
Directive, the international FAFT Standards (e.g. customers due diligence, record 
keeping, financial intelligence units etc.), the IOSCO ‘Principles on Client Identification 
and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry’ and the ISSA ‘Financial Crime 
Compliance Principles for Securities Custody and Settlement’. 
2.1 International Provisions 
2.1.1 The FATF Recommendations 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body founded in 1989 
by the Ministers of its member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to put 
standards and promote efficient application of legal, regulatory and operational 
measures in order to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other criminal 
activities posing threat to the integrity of the international financial system. Hence, the 
FAFT is a policy-making body, which tries to bring forth the essential political will in order 
to proceed with national legislative and regulatory improvements in these areas. The 
FATF has established for this reason a series of recommendations that are 
acknowledged as the international standard to combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These 
recommendations set the foundation for a coordinated reaction towards the 
aforementioned threats and assist in guaranteeing a level playing field. Originally issued 
in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and lately, in 
February 2012, the FATF concluded an in-depth revision of its standards and published 
the revised FATF Recommendations, in order to ensure that they are still up to date and 
relevant, and they are meant to be of worldwide application. This revision targeted to 
reinforce universal safeguards and further preserve the integrity of the financial system 
by offering governments more powerful instruments to take action against financial 
crime. In addition, they have been extended to deal with new threats, such as the 
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financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to be more explicit on 
transparency and stricter on corruption. Moreover, the Nine Special Recommendations 
on terrorist financing have been fully integrated with the measures against money 
laundering and this has led to a stronger and clearer set of standards.52 Having in mind 
that countries have different legal, administrative and operational frameworks and 
diverse financial systems, and so cannot all take the same measures to fight these 
threats, the FATF Recommendations, therefore, set an international standard, which 
countries should adopt through measures depending on their particular circumstances. 
In other words, the FATF Recommendations establish the necessary measures that 
countries should implement in order to identify the dangers, chase money laundering, 
terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, implement preventive measures, 
enhance the transparency and accessibility to beneficial ownership information, and 
facilitate international cooperation.53 
The main changes regarding the FATF Recommendations are: 
The Risk-based approach: Countries should clearly comprehend the money laundering 
and terrorist financing risks which have impact on them, and adjust their anti-money 
laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems depending on the 
nature of these risks by implementing either enhanced measures where the risks are 
higher or simplified measures where the risks are lower. The FATF has set out the risk-
based approach so that the countries and the financial intermediaries will be qualified 
to target their assets more efficiently. A well-applied risk-based approach results that 
the AML/CFT system will be more efficient, and will support countries adopt measures 
to embolden financial inclusion, as called for by the G20.54 
Transparency: The absence of transparency about the ownership and control of legal 
persons and legal arrangements, or about the parties to wire transfers, makes those 
instruments exposed to abuse by launderers and terrorists. The FATF has reinforced 
transparency requirements in these areas. Now, reliable information is required to be 
available about the beneficial ownership and control of companies, trusts, and other 
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legal persons or legal arrangements. Also more strict requirements are implemented on 
the information which must come along with wire transfers. Measures to enhance 
transparency, applied on a universal base, will make it more difficult for launderers and 
terrorists to conceal their activities.55 
International Cooperation: With the growing globalization of money laundering and 
terrorist financing threats, the FATF has also reinforced the scope and application of 
international cooperation between authorities. The revised Recommendations permit 
more efficient exchanges of data for investigative, supervisory and prosecutorial 
purposes. This will also help countries in tracing, freezing, and confiscating illegal 
assets.56 
Operational Standards: The FATF Recommendations regarding law enforcement and 
Financial Intelligence Units have been extended considerably. The revisions clarify the 
role and functions of the operational agencies in charge of combating money laundering 
and terrorist financing and establish the variety of investigative practices and powers 
which should be available to them, e.g., to acquire and analyse financial information 
about a suspected criminal’s accounts and transactions. 
New Threats & New Priorities: The FATF encounters new intensified threats such as: 
- Financing of Proliferation: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a serious 
security concern, and financial measures can be an efficient way to combat this threat. 
The FATF has adopted a new Recommendation intended to guarantee consistent and 
effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions when these are called for by 
the UN Security Council. 
- Corruption & Politically Exposed Persons: The FATF Recommendations reinforce the 
requirements on financial institutions to identify politically exposed persons (PEPs) – 
who may signify a higher risk of corruption due to the positions they hold. The  
requirement which already exist to apply enhanced due diligence to PEPs has been 
expanded to foreign PEPs, with new risk-based requirements applied to domestic PEPs 
and PEPs from international organisations, and to the family and close associates of all 
PEPs – mirroring the techniques used by corrupt officials to launder the profits of 
corruption. 
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- Tax Crimes: The list of predicate offences for money laundering has been extended to 
embrace serious tax crimes. The profits of tax crimes are introduced within the scope of 
the powers and authorities used to investigate money laundering. The smuggling 
offence has also been clarified to contain offences regarding customs and excise duties 
and taxes, contributing to improved synchronization between law enforcement, border 
and tax authorities, and eliminate possible impediments to international cooperation 
concerning tax crimes. 
- Terrorist Financing: The financing of terrorism remains a significant concern for the 
international community and issue of major importance for the FATF Standards. The 
FATF’s nine Special Recommendations on terrorist financing have been integrated fully 
within the Forty Recommendations, indicating how terrorist financing is a long-standing 
concern and the linking between anti-money laundering measures and measures to 
counter the financing of terrorism.57 
Clarifying obligations: The FATF has updated its Recommendations to illustrate practices 
in the financial sector such as to establish clearer requirements for financial groups and 
to apply the experience gained from the implementation of the FATF Recommendations 
by countries, by clarifying customer due-diligence requirements where countries have 
had practical difficulties with implementation.58 As far as Customer Due Diligence (CDD) 
obligations concerned which are reinforced, the new version of Recommendation 10 
obliges countries to set CDD obligations in law whether this is through legislation or 
legally binding regulations. Financial institutions should be prohibited from keeping 
anonymous or fictitious accounts. In addition, they should be required to undertake 
customer due diligence (CDD) measures when establishing business relations, carrying 
out occasional transactions or when has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer identification data. The CDD measures to be taken are 
Identifying the customer or the beneficial owner and verifying its identity using reliable 
information and taking reasonable measures to accomplish that and conducting ongoing 
due diligence on the business relationship. 59 Moreover, the requirement to 
comprehend the nature and purpose of a business relationship expands on the prior 
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requirement to simply collect data, which mirrors the advanced corporate and financial 
structures used today.60  Furthermore, the obligation for record-keeping has been 
reinforced from merely an obligation to keep records to an obligation to keep all records, 
and the explicit inclusion of an analysis undertaken is coherent, with the emphasis on 
taking a risk-based approach. Moreover, the reference to occasional transactions 
displays how contemporary business is done, and the obligation by law to keep records 
further confirms the refined reinforcement of this provision.61 
2.1.2 IOSCO principles on client identification and beneficial ownership for the 
securities industry 
On a global level, the alarms concerning financial crime within the universal financial 
system and mostly in the securities industry, had as a result that the members of the 
financial system were led to the implementation of particular principles and guidelines. 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published on May 
2004 the “Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities 
Industry”, so that these principles constitute as guidelines for the securities regulatory 
authorities as well as for accredited securities services providers. The aforementioned 
principles underline the mutual characteristics between the diverse regulatory 
approaches to client and beneficial owner identification of IOSCO members, 
notwithstanding the fact that dissimilar legal structures are applied in diverse 
jurisdictions. Also, they intend to support the implementation of a client due diligence 
process (CDD) in the securities market in order to impede its misuse through illegitimate 
deeds such as money laundering and financing of terrorism. Particularly, according to 
Principle 1, “authorized securities service providers (ASSPs) when establishing a business 
relationship with a client, should identify and verify the client’s identity using reliable, 
independent source documents data or other information”. Moreover, according to 
Principle 1a “ASSPs should have specific Client Due Diligence policies for omnibus 
accounts”. When the client establishing the omnibus account is a domestic financial 
institution, the risk of illegal activity is lower. The application of simplified identification 
and verification procedures in relation to such accounts may be suitable. However, 
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when the client establishing the omnibus account is a foreign financial institution, the 
risks associated with the account in some circumstances may be considered to be 
potentially higher, and enhanced procedures may be required. These enhanced 
procedures include gathering sufficient information regarding the financial institution to 
understand its business, assessing the adequacy of that financial institution’s CDD 
process, determining whether the financial institution has a physical presence in the 
jurisdiction where it is incorporated, assessing the regulatory regime of the country in 
which the financial institution is located, and documenting the respective 
responsibilities of each institution. Furthermore, “ASSPs should obtain sufficient 
information in order to identify persons who beneficially own or control securities 
accounts” as it is set up in Principle 2. According to this Principle, whenever securities 
appear to acquired or maintained through an account are beneficially owned by a party 
other than the client, that party should be identified using client identification and 
verification procedures established in accordance with the criteria set out in Principle 1 
and 1a, following a risk-based approach. When establishing a business relationship, all 
clients should be required to specify whether they are acting for their own account or 
for the account of beneficial owners and representatives. ASSPs should take reasonable 
measures to identify and verify the beneficial owners of client accounts, including 
reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of clients that 
are non-natural persons. The recommended actions include that the client is required 
to certify to the account provider the identity of the persons who exercise ultimately 
effective control over a legal person. Know your client (KYC) practices, record keeping 
on the CDD process for at least five years, third party reliance, enhanced powers to the 
regulator and cooperation between jurisdictions and authorities, constitute the total of 
the principles of IOSCO. 62 
2.1.3 ISSA financial crime compliance principles for securities custody and settlement 
The International Securities Services Association (ISSA) issued the ‘Financial Crime 
Compliance Principles for Securities Custody and Settlement’ on 27 August 2015 and 
first revised on May 2017, in order to provide global guidance on the establishment and 
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maintenance of cross-border securities custody relationships. Under ISSA terminology, 
a professional securities custodian may be defined as a regulated financial institution 
providing securities custody / safekeeping accounts, securities settlement and other 
related services.  Thus, these principles aim to provide guidance to securities custodians, 
on how to best manage the risks that arise from the layers of intermediation between 
securities issuers and ultimate beneficial owners, and also provide to market 
participants with practical guidance on the question of transparency of ownership and 
control in the intermediated securities custody arrangements. 63 The custodians are 
used by its customers for the safekeeping of proprietary and third party interests in 
securities, and the settlement and clearing of securities trades. 64 All account holders of 
the custodian shall be subjected to appropriate due diligence that will seek to satisfy the 
custodian that it is comfortable conducting business with a particular account holder, in 
the light of that account holder’s risk profile and the nature of the business relationship 
that it will have with the custodian. A strong indication that the account holder is not 
suspicious of conducting illegitimate business is the possible compliance of the account 
holder within a regulatory environment that applies and implements the principles of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). However, the custodian should not rely solely on 
the account holder’s regulatory status but should, as appropriate, take into account 
other information through the due diligence process. The custodian’s policies and 
procedures shall require that the information on the account holder is reviewed and 
updated on a periodic basis. The relevant risk indicators that should be taken into 
account include the account holder’s ownership and management structures, its 
geographic risk, account holder’s business franchise and the anti-money laundering and 
compliance controls. Consequently, control methodologies must focus on asset holdings 
and not just on the execution of transactions by asset owners. Therefore, in dealing with 
custody accounts established for the purpose of safekeeping and transacting in 
securities interests ultimately owed to third party clients, the custodian shall apply the 
ISSA Principles and in order to ensure that the custodian can meet its obligations and 
fulfil the objectives of its compliance policies, it should communicate its requirements 
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to its account holders and obtain representations and undertakings relating to them 
contractually.65 According to policies and standards that should be followed, it is the 
responsibility of the custodian to communicate to its account holders any relevant Know 
Your Customer (KYC) standards and other compliance and risk-based requirements that 
it expects them to follow. It is though the responsibility of the account holder in turn to 
comply with those standards and requirements. Where the account holder has direct 
clients who themselves accept deposits of third party client securities, it is the 
responsibility of the account holder to notify the clients that by holding securities cross-
border they will be subject to the requirements of the jurisdictions in which the 
securities entitlements are held, including the standards of the relevant custodian. It is 
the responsibility of the account holder to sub-deposit securities with the custodian only 
when the ultimate asset owners have been subjected to satisfactory due diligence. In 
the case of omnibus client accounts kept for numerous clients of the account holder, 
specific factors of the account holders’ business are controlled by the custodians. 
Whether the account holders are regulated and authorized to accept client assets, the 
regulatory framework under which they execute their operations, whether they have 
applied and implemented any particular requirements of the custodian concerning their 
compliance policies, all these establish relevant factors required to be taken into 
account by the custodians in order to commence or continue to do business with 
account holders that want to open or maintain with the custodian omnibus accounts 
commingling securities kept for their clients. The custodian has the right to request the 
beneficial ownership of assets deposited on omnibus client accounts to be disclosed to 
the custodian via an agreed operational procedure based on predetermined risk factors. 
Pursuant to Principle 17, the custodian should be entitled to require its account holder 
to disclose the identities of the ultimate buyers or sellers of securities within a 
reasonable period in response to a specific request predicated on risk factors.66 
 
The above framework, including guidance and principles of IOSCO and ISSA, establishes 
the pillar stone of the anti-money laundering policies of intermediaries that take part in 
the intermediated holding chain. 
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2.2 The EU Legislation 
The intensification of money laundering and terrorist financing along with tax evasion 
and national austerity programs resulted to the introduction of combating money 
laundering and financial crime onto the European Union political agenda. This has urged 
a series of directives to be passed through the European Commission. The common 
purpose of all these directives was guarding the universal financial system from being 
used for illegitimate purposes. The several EU money-laundering directives are the 
means how the EU integrates the FATF’s international standards in order to provide 
consolidated money-laundering legislation, while simultaneously underlining particular 
further concerns which are of importance to EU lawmakers. As with all EU law directives, 
it is required by national governments to transform these requirements into domestic 
law.67 
The First EU AML Directive (1991) 68 focused on combating the laundering of drug 
proceeds through the financial sector. Explicit obligations were placed on businesses in 
the financial sector for customer identification, staff training, record -keeping and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions. The Second AML Directive (2001)69 amended the 
First by expanding the scope of predicate offences for which suspicious transaction 
reporting was obligatory from drug trafficking to all serious offences and by extending 
the scope of the Directive to include a number of non-financial activities and 
professions. The Third AML Directive (2005) 70 also extended its scope to combat the 
financing of terrorism. It is fundamentally based on the FATF Recommendations, 
adopting a risk-based approach to address money-laundering deterrence, which is 
encouraged throughout several provisions, particularly within due diligence 
requirements.71 The Fourth AML Directive (2015) 72 restates pre-existing measures. The 
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‘risk-based’ approach to the prevention and detection of money-laundering is preserved 
and reinforced. But four noteworthy developments are appeared. First, greater 
provision is set to remove the veil of secrecy by which natural persons act behind trusts, 
or who own or control a legal entity through direct or indirect ownership of shares, or 
voting rights or by “other means”. This contains a requirement that Member States 
acquire and hold sufficient and reliable beneficial ownership information on a central 
register. Secondly, specific categories of natural and legal persons are acknowledged to 
be at risk of being targeted and misused by money-launderers. These include 
professionals and entities in charge of creating trusts, and corporate structures, as well 
as entities through whom the profits of crime may be laundered. Thirdly, further 
provision is made for obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures and 
enhanced measures under specified conditions, especially concerning “high risk” third 
countries. Fourthly, it is mostly highlighted the collaboration “to the greatest extent 
possible” between Member States, their respective Financial Investigation Units (FIUs), 
and with the Commission.73 
On April 19, 2018, the EU Commissioners welcomed the adoption by the European 
Parliament of the 5th Anti- Money Laundering Directive. 74 Almost a year after the 
implementation of the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the European Parliament 
has adopted a new directive which intends to supplement further layers to the European 
anti-money laundering framework. The 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive ("5AMLD"), 
published on June 19, 2018, should be fully implemented into national law by the 
Member States by 10 January 2020. The declaration observed that the ambitious round 
of negotiations over the 5th Directive began in July 2016 in the corollary of the terrible 
terrorist attacks that struck the EU and the massive financial transactions revealed by 
the "Panama Papers." It provides with a series of measures in order to enhance the 
countering of the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of 
financial transactions, the most important of them are: a. Register of Beneficial Owners 
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- The 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive obliged EU Member States to acquire and 
hold precise and up-to-date information on corporate and other legal entities, and to 
make such information available to persons with a "legitimate interest." The 5AMLD has 
proceeded one step further and requires that all EU citizens should have access to such 
information without needed to prove a legitimate interest in such information. In 
addition, the beneficial ownership register requirements also apply to trusts and similar 
arrangements, subject to the "legitimate interests" requirements. In this regard, 
Member States are also provided with the discretion to permit wider access to beneficial 
ownership information on trusts.75 The beneficial ownership registers for legal entities 
are public. This wider access to part of the beneficial ownership information strengthens 
public scrutiny and contributes to preventing the misuse of legal entities for money 
laundering and terrorist financing purposes. The access to information on the beneficial 
owner of trusts is possible without any limitations to competent authorities, Financial 
Intelligence Units, the professional sectors subject to Anti-Money laundering rules, such 
as banks, lawyers, etc. and is available to other persons who can demonstrate a 
legitimate interest. Moreover, when a trust is a beneficial owner of a corporation, access 
to this information can be requested via a written request. The national registers on 
beneficial ownership information are interconnected directly to assist collaboration and 
exchange of information between Member States. Additionally, Member States have to 
set up confirmation mechanisms of the beneficial ownership information collected by 
the registers to support improve the accuracy of the information and the 
trustworthiness of these registers.76 
b. Strengthening FIUs - To ensure that FIU'S start receiving and sharing information in 
an efficient and timely way, the new directive demands that EU Members should start 
providing with automated information systems, such as central registers. Moreover, the 
5 AMLD provides for the enhanced powers of FIUs, who shall be allowed access to 
information from entities on their own initiative and without the need of a prior report 
being made.  
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c. Enhanced Due Diligence for High Risk Countries - At present, EU Member States are at 
liberty to regulate their own enhanced due diligence procedures regarding high risk third 
countries, and this has resulted in several differences. The 5AMLD targets to create a 
standardised approach to professional relations involving high risk countries and creates 
unified enhanced due diligence measures across the EU. 77 
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Chapter 3: Access to beneficial ownership information and data 
protection implications 
This last chapter underlines the complications between increased transparency 
requirements and protection of data and privacy rights. 
 
The effort on the way to transparency in the framework of money laundering, terrorist 
financing and other unwanted behavior, nonetheless, might conflict with concerns and 
requirements as regards privacy, data protection, confidentiality and (banking) secrecy 
that by nature prevent transparency. For example, IOSCO Principles underline that ‘no 
domestic secrecy laws, regulations, codes or provisions’ should obstruct or constrain the 
gathering of data and records by the regulator and, in terms of international 
cooperation, the provision of client identification information. Simultaneously, 
regulators have to make sure that the information gained by foreign regulators are 
utilized ‘consistent with requirements concerning privacy and data protection’. Under 
the revised FATF Recommendations, it is required that authorities make certain that 
national cooperation in the area of money laundering and terrorist financing is 
compatible with ‘Data Protection and Privacy rules and other similar provisions’ and also 
that countries ‘should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations’. Furthermore, the ISSA Principles bring 
up the issue of ‘local legal or regulatory requirements that make compliance with the 
above Principles unlawful without appropriate consents or at all’. Moreover, in Fifth 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive is stated that access to certain beneficial ownership 
information shall be ‘in accordance with data protection rules’.78 
As it is indicated in previous chapter, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (5 
AMLD) targets to enable even greater financial transparency, particularly by offering 
authorities and FIUs with timely and unrestricted access to beneficial ownership 
information and through the implementation of public registers. An explanation for 
improving access to beneficial ownership information on corporate entities and trusts is 
that the comprehension of such information is essential to reduce the threat of financial 
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crime and shape prevention policies. Enhancing public access to beneficial ownership, 
assist to the prevention of the misuse of corporate entities and trusts through greater 
scrutiny. Furthermore, the expansion of access to beneficial ownership information to 
those with a ‘legitimate interest’ raises several concerns regarding the possible tension 
between the privacy and transparency of a trust. Parties with a ‘legitimate interest’ were 
described as any person  or  organisation  who  can  demonstrate  engagement  with  or  
proven  track  record  in activities  related  to  fighting money  laundering  and  terrorist  
financing,  or  ‘associated  predicate offences’ activities. Moreover, constraining  public  
access  to  central  register  information  on  trusts  to  those  with  a  legitimate interest 
may appear as a reasonable and practical compromise to moderate concerns about 
confidentiality and privacy breaches. However, due to the lack of clearer guidelines 
about the fundamental sense of ‘legitimate interest’, there is the peril of dissimilar legal 
senses adopted by Member States which could affect the scope of access to information. 
Therefore, a serious concern is raised by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) about regulating access by parties claiming a ‘legitimate interest’ in order to 
escape opportunistic access. Additionally, Member States could permit broader access 
to register information which indicates that the transparency net can be thrown even 
broader beyond those with a ‘legitimate interest’. The broadening scope of accessibility 
brings into surface the relevant question whether transparency could balance with 
privacy and data protection. For example, a trustee has a duty of confidentiality as a 
fiduciary. However, this confidentiality duty may be overridden on public interest 
grounds or under coercion of law. Someone could argue that there may be solid policy 
grounds for allowing disclosure on public interest grounds if the privacy that the trust 
scheme provides, can be used as a cover for abuse and corruption. In contrast, the 
increasing request for enhanced financial transparency accompanied by wider 
disclosure of and access to confidential information creates tension with the 
fundamental concept of privacy. 79 
 
The common basis, regarding which personal data and beneficial ownership information 
may be collected, comes with the extension of the policy objectives for such collection 
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as well as the processing and use of the information. As far as data protection is 
concerned, two related principles deserve extra research, i.e. the ‘purpose limitation’ 
principle and the ‘proportionality principle’. The ‘purpose limitation’ principle targets to 
make sure that personal data are collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate’ 
purposes. The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, according to the EDPS80, causes 
insecurity regarding the aims pursued on those who are processing the data, i.e. the 
data controllers, which decrease data protection defenses, such as the proportionality 
among processing personal data and the aims of such processing. Secondly, the principle 
of proportionality is a well-founded principle which demands proportionality among the 
measure taken that conflicts with data protection and the aims pursued to be 
accomplished. Furthermore, the wide approach taken in the Fifth AML Directive 
concerning whose data should be collected and when these data should be disclosed 
and registered raises further concerns. While the Fourth AML Directive clearly 
supported a risk-based approach, the amendments by the Fifth AML Directive designate 
that risk only may not be adequate and increased requirements appeared for ongoing 
monitoring of particular existing clients. Moreover, the reporting obligations included in 
the Fifth AML Directive in relation to trusts indicate that a bigger amount of data may 
need to be reported about trusts irrespectively of whether they cause e.g. tax 
consequences or pose any efficient risk to money laundering, terrorist financing or other 
related predicate offences. With the formation of public central registers added, access 
is provided to not only law enforcement authorities and FIUs but also the public, though 
on a limited basis, which may raise a further potential for issues of proportionality to 
arise. 81 
The EDPS questions whether the broader access offered by the Fifth AML Directive is 
truly needed and argues that, if the purpose of policy of beneficial ownership 
information’s publicity is detecting and combating money laundering, terrorist financing 
and other criminal activities, such as, tax evasion, in a timely and effective way, it may 
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be done in an equivalent way by ensuring that such data is transferred to competent 
authorities, without the requirement for public access. Thus, when public access to 
personal data is provided, it is crucial that careful consideration should be given to the 
proportionality of the measures providing such access. It would appear that once a third 
party, even though one with a ‘legitimate interest’, gains access to such data, the  
confidential  information is  questionably within the  public domain and thus loses its 
right to the protection of confidentiality. This may be challenging given that there is no 
clarity yet regarding the numerous aims for processing the data and who amongst 
numerous data controllers should be considered reliable. Therefore, these privacy 
concerns have driven the EDPS to phrase explicitly serious worries about the scope of 
the Fifth AML Directive and its solid possibility to violate data protection and privacy 
rights on the grounds of proportionality.82 83 
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Conclusions 
 
The vulnerabilities of the securities sector in the financial system is exceedingly elevated, 
having always in mind the complexity and the speed of the performed transactions in 
this market, which frequently take place in a cross-border context. If one adds the 
inherent characteristics of the non-transparent intermediated holding systems that 
would not contribute to the revelation of the investor’s identity it is evident that these 
vulnerabilities are much elevated. The so-called ‘no- look-through’ principle in these 
systems forms a gap among the investor and the issuer, including the (upper-level) 
intermediaries between them, which causes significant problems in identifying the 
investor and the source of its funds. This situation may be abused by the perpetrators 
of financial crime, which may misuse the financial system and the securities sector 
particularly for money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation, insider 
trading, market manipulation and other undesirable behavior. 
 
In this context, a regulatory framework was developed in order to detect and prevent 
the movement of illegitimate funds within the financial system, by implementing 
increased transparency requirements both in International and EU level. Indeed, the 
adoption of more transparent holding systems could reduce significant problems caused 
by intermediation. Although, such transparency requirements should be implemented, 
as already discussed, with respect to the protection of data and privacy of individuals’, 
in terms of two interconnected principles, the ‘purpose limitation’ principle and the 
‘proportionality’ principle. 
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